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Memorandum for [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: NIE-32, Paragraphs 17-21

1. The presentation of this section in the 30 March draft is, in my opinion, preferable to the revision submitted 3 April by Mr.

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[REDACTED] The former might be revised somewhat (probably in paragraph 17)

to indicate various methods by which Soviet intervention might be disguised, but I would be hesitant to stress the "international army" theme too strenuously for several reasons: a) We have had numerous reports of international brigades before, notably in connection with Greece, and ~~exhaustive~~ exhaustive checks have proved negative; (b) the latest report of an "international army" allegedly came from a Chinese Communist cabinet meeting, and such subjects are not usually discussed in Communist cabinets judging primarily from our knowledge of the East German and North Korean governments, and (3) even using such involved ruses, the West would realize the extent of Soviet responsibility and the decisive factor would be whether or not the UN powers could shut their eyes to it or recognize it publicly and accept the consequences. Detailed comments on the 3 April revision based on a

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rapid review in the limited time available, follow.

**LAST**

2. Paragraph 17: The ~~sent~~ sentence of this paragraph is probably correct, but it is not supported by the preceding material. The reference to Soviet propaganda is only half the story. This propaganda has always put Communist victory in "virtue conquers sin" terms, Stalin answered his own question in these terms, and its volume has been heavy in times of Chinese victory and surprisingly light in times of defeat. In short, it has not committed the USSR in any course of action.

Paragraph 17 also treats a possible strain in Sino-Soviet relations as more than a conceivable possibility. We frankly have no reliable information on this score, and it may have no effect whatsoever on the Korean campaign, or it may have a decisive effect.

3. Paragraph 18. I gather from the military reports and statements of our military leaders that intervention sufficient to drive us from Korea would have to be large scale and, by its nature, it would be difficult to conceal. In any event, the decisive factor would be US public recognition or non-recognition of such action as

Soviet intervention. The draft gives the impression that a few  
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<sup>3</sup>  
Yakut<sup>3</sup> could turn the tide. This paragraph, and paragraph 19 as well,  
imply a broad area in which Soviet aid can be increased and remain

"covert," and, at the same time, be sufficient to defeat the UN forces.

I believe this capability to be restricted largely to supply of heavy

equipment, technical assistance, and perhaps a limited number of

*(in driving UN Forces from all Korea)*  
"volunteers" and this would not necessarily be effective. Also, it

entails a training problem of considerable *proportions* and ~~proportions~~

*probably*  
the commitment of, and heavy casualties among, skilled personnel of

considerable importance to the Chinese.

*The increased Soviet air activity noted in the  
3 April draft is of sufficient importance that it  
should be included in the final draft.*

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